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# STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE?

BY


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#### WHO'S IN CHARGE?

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#### ABSTRACT

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Selective Engagement, one of the premiere post cold war grand strategies, refers to activities between the US and other nations ranging from trade relations to diplomatic recognition to combined military exercises. This involvement promotes trust and confidence and encourages measures that increase our security and that of our allies, partners, and friends. Fourteen US governmental agencies engage with countries of the world to advance our national interests. Over 150 Non-Governmental Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations and International Organizations also engage worldwide. Who orchestrates this effort to minimize conflicting activities that would waste Regional CINCs and Ambassadors control US engagement activities but must use diplomacy and good inter-personal relationships with these 150 independent agencies.

#### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Engagement:The Nations Premier Grand Startegy, Who's In Charge? I
Abstract III
List Of FiguresVII
Engagement
Selective Engagement 3
National Security Strategy 5
Engagement As Used In Other Us Policy Statements 8
Instruments Of National Power
Guidance To The Department Of State / Ambassadors 15
Guidance To Department Of Defense / Regional CINCs 17
Coordinating The DOS And DOD
Worldwide Engagement Agencies
Conclusion 22
Endnotes 23
Bibliography 25

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	1.	Strategic Analysis Process	6
Figure	2.	US Interests And Policies	7
Figure	3.	National Instruments Of Power 1	4
Figure	4.	Agencies & Organizations That Engage 2	0

# ENGAGEMENT: THE NATION'S PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY WHO'S IN CHARGE?

"Engagement is the act of being engaged. To engage is to entangle or to involve." "Engagement activities, including information sharing and contacts between our military and the armed forces of other nations, promote trust and confidence and encourage measures that increase our security and that of our allies, partners, and friends. By increasing understanding and reducing uncertainty, engagement builds constructive security relationships, helps to promote the development of democratic institutions, and helps keep some countries from becoming adversaries tomorrow."2 When countries integrate economies, militaries and cultures through engagement, regional stability and world peace is promoted. Peace loving countries are constantly looking for ways to shape the world environment for the good of all mankind. This desire to shape the world means regional Commanders In Chiefs (CINCs) and US Ambassadors could have as many as 14 US governmental departments and agencies and over 150 different Private Volunteer Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and International Organizations

(PVOs/NGOs & IOs) actively engaged in their Area of Operations (AOR).

US government agencies engage to promote US National
Interests but other agencies that engage, such as the NGOs, PVOs
and IOs, often have quite different interests. These interests
vary as much as their founding charters vary. Some work to
promote specific religions, others attempt to improve legal
systems, while others concentrate on creating a stable
environment to safeguard the global community as a whole. These
agencies are engaged in virtually every country worldwide to some
degree. Their agendas include everything from tracking human
rights violations, to promoting programs for financial aide, to
deploying missionaries and teachers. With all of this activity
it is likely that there will be a large number of potentially
competing agendas working within a single country.

It is possible for some of these organizations to engage in ways inconsistent with the engagement strategies of the US

Ambassadors and regional CINCs. These organizations may find themselves promoting agendas contrary to, and in complete disregard of, the overall US engagement policy, the National Security Strategy (NSS). With all these organizations pursuing their own engagement agendas, the question of coordination and de-confliction naturally surfaces.

Is there a central entity to coordinate the engagement programs of the US agencies, NGO/PVOs and IOs to ensure engagement efforts are not in contradiction with each other? This research paper will discuss engagement as a national or Grand Strategy; specifically who engages, what tools are available to engage and how it is implemented. The objective is to explain how the President of the United States, through his regional CINCs and Ambassadors, executes the grand strategy of Selective Engagement.

#### SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

"The post-Cold War era has as its most significant attribute the absence of any immediate, vital threat to US national security. The demise of the Soviet Union has left the United States as the preeminent world leader and empowered it with unparalleled leadership responsibilities. But the end of superpower competition also eliminated the unifying strategy of U.S. foreign policy." Despite the absence now of a primary adversary, it is still essential that our foreign policy continue to reflect that the US is a world power and has the responsibility and ability to shape the current political, economic and military environment. To fulfill the responsibility of shaping world events, the US must stay involved in the

international environment. This involvement or engagement is actually one of the four varieties of possible national grand strategies: Isolationism, Selective Engagement, Primacy, and Cooperative Security.<sup>5</sup>

Selective Engagement, defined as picking areas to become involved in based on applicability to a national interest, appears to be the primary US strategy emerging from the post cold war era. The concept of engagement is so fundamental to relationships with other countries that it can be used to define the other grand strategies. Isolationism is the total lack of engagement in other countries regardless of world events. Primacy is total engagement in other countries, which promotes US interests over those of the host nation. Cooperative Security includes agreements to become significantly engaged with signatory countries under certain prescribed conditions. As a result of these agreements these countries will receive various levels of engagement to ensure conditions of these agreements are monitored.

The US has responded to world events such as; starvation in Somalia, oppression in Haiti, and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. These isolated actions indicate that Selective Engagement is the strategy that governs our relationship with the rest of the world. To maintain our moral integrity and the

support of the nation, as well as the world, we must engage in a manner consistent with our values. The US Selective Engagement policy, grounded in these core values, is spelled out in a single document called the National Security Strategy (NSS).

#### NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy is the product of the six steps of the Strategic Analysis Process shown in figure 1 below. It is the President's foundation document on what is important to the country and how the US should relate to the rest of the world and the document upon which US agency strategy is built. This document reflects US core values of respect and dignity of the individual, individual rights and responsibilities to maintain an orderly society, representative governance, and free and open markets. These core values assist us in formulating National Interests, and after a Strategic Appraisal, to determine intensity of interests, formulation of National Policy and National Strategy. Additionally, our strategy remains morally defensible on the world stage due to its foundation upon widely accepted values.

National Values

National Interests

Strategic Appraisal

National Policy

National Strategy

 $\mathbf{k}\mathbf{\Lambda}\mathbf{A}$ 

Strategies of the Various Governmental Agencies

Figure 1. Strategic Analysis Process

The NSS defines the focus for all US activities abroad.

This one document encourages civilian and governmental agencies to create their own strategies that support US national interests. Unfortunately, these various agencies and organizations often depart form US interests, and develop strategies of their own.

Some of these strategies radically differ from the NSS because they are influenced by pressures from interest groups, have strong personal and organizational agendas, and are subject to internal struggles for power. While engagement activities of US governmental agencies must support the NSS, US based NGOs, and PVOs are not required to support even the national interests and policies listed in figure 2. Strategies of non-US based NGOs,

PVOs and IOs aren't necessarily based on the NSS and may have no desire to advance any of the interests or policies listed below.

Interests
Defense Of The Homeland
Economic Well Being
Favorable World Order
Promotion Of Values

Policies
Promote Democracy
Open Markets
Free Trade
Counter-Narcotics
Human Rights Protection

Figure 2. US Interests and Policies

Virtually everything the US government does that touches other countries can be traced back to one or more of the interests in figure 2. Government agencies tailor their engagement activities to promote one or more of these interests by creating policy statements with specific strategies and programs of engagement. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) publishes the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Department of State (DOS) publishes an annual DOS Policy Statement. Departmental policies and programs that engage, stated in these documents, often address multiple interests with the same engagement tool. For example, road construction projects that promote economic well being by improving farm to market routes also improve access to remote areas for counternarcotics activities.

If a single engagement activity addresses multiple interests, multiple agencies engaging in the same area will undoubtedly overlap requiring coordination. To coordinate the various policies on engagement we need agreement on the definition and use of the term engagement. The term should be used consistently through out the government. When we look at the various ways the DOD uses the term engagement in policy statements we see that the term is not always used to describe shaping the environment through social and economic involvement activities.

# ENGAGEMENT AS USED IN OTHER US POLICY STATEMENTS

The term engagement is very prominent in most Joint and Service policy and vision statements, but it is not always used to describe the shaping of peacetime relationships. The National Military Strategy (NMS) defines the nation's mandate to Shape, Respond and Prepare Now (emphasis added) for the future. This shaping of the environment is achieved by engagement activities directed at promoting regional stability and other national interests.

Joint Vision 2010 lists four operational concepts: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection and Focused Logistics. In the operational concept of Precision

Engagement, the idea of engagement refers to the use of high fidelity technology, such as target acquisition with smart munitions. "Precision engagement will consist of a system of systems that enables our forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to re-engage with precision when required." In this context the term engagement refers to tactical operations rather than the shaping of the environment.

On the other hand, Army Vision 2010 re-enforces the need to Shape the Battlespace. This shaping of the battlespace can also refer to engagement efforts to shape coalition relationships and host nation actions. The Army Vision document is focused primarily at the battlefield aspect of the battlespace, but global engagement activities will continue to shape the battlespace through coalition building efforts. In this light Army Vision 2010 uses the terms engagement and shape interchangeably to describe how the Army should affect the world.

The Air Force use of the term engagement, Precise

Engagement, is consistent with the Joint Vision concept of

Precision Engagement. Again, this use of the term engagement to

describe accurate fires or precise placement of munitions has no

relation to the engagement or shaping strategy discussed in this

paper. The application of the Air Force's strategy of Precision Engagement can be stretched to include the logistics effort by using the term to define the right load in the right place at the right time. Analogous to focused logistics; precise engagement could be used to define the right involvement (with country X), in the right amount, in the right place, at the right time. But generally the Air Force's use of the term engagement refers to precise fires and not shaping.

The Naval use of the term engagement in its vision statement, Forward... From the Sea "...underscores the premise that the most important role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises." The vision continues to state, "...Many of our most vital interests remain overseas where the Navy and the Marine Corps are prepared for new challenges--forward deployed, ready for combat, and engaged to preserve peace." The Navy's use of the term engagement is therefore also consistent with the shaping or involvement concept used by the NSS.

The NSS states: "The Imperative of Engagement -- First, we must be willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-states. In short, American leadership and engagement in the world are vital

for our security, and the world is a safer place as a result."11
This concept of engagement should be implemented consistently
throughout the US government.

Consequently, even within a governmental agency as formal as the military, the term engagement is used to mean different things. Fortunately, the regional CINCs will ultimately coordinate DOD activities while non DOD agencies will be coordinated by the local Ambassador. To discuss other US agencies that engage, and therefore must be coordinated, we will look at the other national instruments of power, specifically economic and political.

#### INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Since instability anywhere in the world can affect the US in immediate and significant ways, the US "uses all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of the other states..." and encourage regional stability and security. 12 Regional stability provides the opportunity to promote prosperity, democracy and western values. While the military instrument of national power is a very visible engagement tool, it is the economic and political instruments that influence nations on a day to day basis. Engagement activities such as monetary transfers, cultural exchanges, and foreign travel plans

are significantly influenced by the climate surrounding the diplomatic relationship with the host nations.

It is becoming common knowledge that "...international issues now affect every American." For example, there is such interaction between world markets, that they can affect each other even if not connected by direct bilateral trade relationships. Loss of investor confidence caused by regional instability anywhere in the world can have a great impact on other nation's stock markets. Since instability in regions that previously had no vital interest to the US can now effect world markets, it is in the best interest of the US to at least maintain regions at the status quo.

We have seen that engagement is the use of our national power to maintain this status quo while, at the same time, advancing programs that are aimed at curtailing drug traffic, promoting human rights, encouraging democracy, and expanding US markets. These programs are implemented through economic, diplomatic, and military instruments of US national power.

Economic engagement covers a wide range of programs.

Financial incentives are an effective engagement tool since

countries usually interact with the US when money is involved.

Whether it is obtaining funding for a national program; acquiring

materiel, food or medicine; or maintaining Most Favored Nation

status, financial aide has always been a preferred way for the US to affect the behavior of others.

Diplomatic engagement ranges from recognition of sovereign states and foreign governments, to presidential visits, to all aspects of the embassy itself. The mere existence of an embassy is an engagement tool. Through official diplomatic ceremonies, informal meetings, and embassy employees living among the locals, the Department of State's presence is engagement in and of itself.

Similarly, "...overseas...forces embody global military engagement. They serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies; contribute uniquely to the stability, continuity, and flexibility that protects US interests; and are crucial to continued democratic and economic development." In addition to our presence overseas, our military engagement consists of a variety of military to military and political to military events.

U.S. and host nation defense forces conduct combined exercises to improve cooperation and strengthen ties.

Much of the peacetime efforts of the DOS and DOD are engagement. This is in the form of forward presence, regional exercises, and infrastructure construction projects. The engagement tools of three of our five instruments of our National Power: Military, Economic and Political, (Geographical and

National Will being the other two), listed below in Figure 3, are a few examples of how the US uses these powers to stay engaged.

Military	<u>Diplomatic</u>	Economic
CJCS Exercises Depl for Trng (DFT) Intl Mil Ed & Tr (IMET) Counterdrug Spt (CD) Mobile Tr Teams (MTT)	State Recognition Presidential Visits Demarshe Treaties & Agreements	

Figure 3. National Instruments of Power and Associated Programs 15

In addition to the agencies that administer the programs listed in figure 3, the State Department proclaims that "...protecting national interests and advancing US goals involve virtually every agency of the government..." US governmental agencies with international reach directly engage as a part of their daily routines. Agencies that deal strictly with domestic policy indirectly engage through the effect their actions have on US markets and thus world markets. For example the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, Transportation, and Energy, have both domestic and international responsibilities. From trade status to travel status, from immigration rules to export of tools, from training flights to basing rights, US agencies directly and indirectly engage through hundreds of programs. US

governmental agencies that inadvertently operate at crosspurposes, through misunderstanding or ignorance, must ultimately
be coordinated at some point. Since there is no single director
below the President to coordinate the US engagement activities of
the three elements of national power, it becomes the
responsibility of the regional CINCs and Ambassadors.

We have seen that both the Departments of Defense and State start with the NSS to develop their own tailored strategies to focus engagement activities. The DOD relays this strategy to regional CINCs primarily through the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Ambassadors receive engagement strategy from their Presidential Appointment Letters and the Department of State Strategic Plan for International Affairs publication.

## GUIDANCE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE / AMBASSADORS

The DOS uses the NSS to develop a Strategic Plan for
International Affairs. This regionally focused document is one
of the tools used to pass the NSS to the rest of the DOS
organization. Then "...on a yearly basis, the Ambassador leads the
Country Team in developing an Embassy Mission Program Plan (MPP)
setting out specific Country Team objectives and stating the
resources required to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives

involving the host country. Although there is sometimes a gap between policy and available resources, this Country Team exercise helps shape overall U.S. relations with the host country." This document is required and approved by the DOS, although approval is not always accompanied by sufficient funds to execute all the engagement activities proposed.

The Ambassador is the President's personal representative in the host nation and is "...responsible for the coordination and implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward that country and will often have a major role in developing that policy...." This includes the actions of other US agencies desiring to operate in the country. The Ambassador, responsible for policy in the host nation, is told in the presidential letter of instruction "...as my representative, you, with the Secretary of State, assist me in the implementation of my constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of relations with (country)." 19

The letter charges the Ambassador "...to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in (country), except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander, under another chief of mission in (country), or on the staff of an international organization. (emphasis added)." The President's letter continues with instructions for the Ambassador

to work with the U.S. area military commander to "...keep each other currently informed and cooperate on all matters of mutual interest." Clearly the Ambassador is responsible for coordinating all the US engagement activities less those of the regional CINCs.

#### GUIDANCE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE / REGIONAL CINCS

The DOD uses the NSS to create the National Military

Strategy (NMS), which defines its policy in the title - Shape,

Respond, and Prepare Now-A Military Strategy for a New Era. The

following excerpt shows how heavily the DOD relies on engagement:

"The military has an important role in engagement--helping to

shape the international environment in appropriate ways to bring

about a more peaceful and stable world."<sup>21</sup> To emphasis the role

of engagement the NMS further states, "Our global engagement

makes the world safer for our Nation, our citizens, our

interests, and our values."<sup>22</sup>

The regional CINCs use the NSS and the NMS to make a regional strategic assessment. From this assessment they create a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) which addresses how the CINC will shape the AOR using assigned forces as well as other military programs that can engage. The CINC must have a strategy for the

entire AOR, as well as a strategy for each country, crafted in concert with the Ambassadors, and using the wide variety of programs available.

Clearly, the two individuals primarily responsible for orchestrating governmental engagement activities abroad are the CINC and the Ambassador. Together the CINCs and Ambassadors have direct control over governmental activities. Since the ambassador is responsible for U.S. policy implementation within a specific country, and the CINC controls the combat forces, it is paramount that their plans do not conflict. They must work together in a synchronized manner to ensure engagement efforts remain consistent.

#### COORDINATING THE DOS AND DOD

The CINC is in charge of all combat troops in the AOR while the Ambassador is in charge of all other military personnel such as the Defense Attaché', forces on temporary duty, and military visitors. On the rare occasion that an issue over conflicting engagement activities could not be resolved in theater, the CINC and the Ambassador forward the issue to the Secretaries of Defense and State, respectively, and use the interagency process to establish policy. This process uses an interagency working group to recommend a solution to the agency directors, or if

necessary, the President. The interagency process is one of negotiation and compromise, not of chain of command. Therefore, the question of who is in charge of policy, below the presidential level, becomes understandably vague. Addressing the interests of multiple agencies in the interagency process usually produces a well-balanced solution to the in-theater issue.

Using the NSS to develop strategy and the interagency working groups to resolve conflicts, the Ambassador and the CINC can coordinate the worldwide activities of the 14 governmental agencies. Conversely, other worldwide agencies, the 150 PVOs, NGOs and IOs, all have their own agendas and opinions on how to best save the world. For example, agencies such as the World Bank, Amnesty International, and Doctors without Borders often operate in direct contradiction to US interests. Any attempt to organize the strategies of the other world engagement agencies is a challenge. The Ambassadors and CINCs must try to minimize conflict between the many programs so efforts of the US engagement activities are not nullified by opposing agendas.

#### WORLDWIDE ENGAGEMENT AGENCIES

The following figure lists the US governmental agencies and some of the PVOs, NGOs and IOs that the CINC and Ambassadors

could have operating in their AOR at the same time. This partial list serves to illustrate the magnitude of the problem.

#### WORLDWIDE ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

GOVERNMENTAL	NGO & IOs	PVOs
Departments of:	CONCERN	Africare
Agriculture	InterAction	American
Commerce	Intl' Cmty of Red Cross	Red Cross
Defense	Intl' Fed of Red Cross/	Catholic
Energy	Red Crescent Socty	Relief Svcs
Justice	Intl' Orgn for Migration	CARE
State	Medicins Sans Frontiers/	Intl' Medical
Transportation	Doctors w/o Borders	Corps
Treasury	Oxfam UK and Ireland	Intl' Rescue
OTHER GOV	Save the Children Fund	Committee
Central Intel Agcy	UN Children's Fund	Lutheran World
Fed Emer Mgnt Agcy	US Cmty for UNICF	Relief, Inc.
Natl Security Csl	UN Dpt of Humanitarian	Oxfam America
Peace Corps	Affairs	Refugees Intl'
Agcy for Intl Devel	UN Food and Agriculture	World Concern
Office of US Frgn	UN World Food Programme	World Vision
Disaster Assist	UN High Commissioner for	World Vision
	Refugees	Relief& Devl
	UN World Health Organization	

Figure 4. Agencies & Organizations that Engage<sup>23</sup>

No one can completely coordinate the efforts of these autonomous organizations. The Ambassador can control US citizens traveling on official or governmental passports through the denial of country clearances. On the other hand, US citizens working for any of these agencies traveling on personal passports must only comply with the host nation rules to gain admittance.

Neither the CINC nor the Ambassador can control the actions of private US citizens in their AORs. Since Ambassadors are responsible for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) it is beneficial for all US citizens to check in with the embassy. However, this optional contact with the embassy carries with it no authority to control entrance or conduct.

Ambassadors have no authority over these organizations, their volunteers or their employees. Their engagement efforts can only be influenced through personal relationships. Many astute CINCs and Ambassadors will develop these relationships through invitations to meetings and briefings in their headquarters and embassies. In the absence of a amicable relationship, the ambassadors, through their personal relationships with the host nation leadership, can attempt to reduce the receptiveness of the host nation to certain detrimental programs. However, any reduction in freedom of the NGOs, PVOs and IOs is politically sensitive and should be avoided.

#### CONCLUSION

While engagement activities of the various governmental agencies are synchronized by the Ambassador and the deployed military force fall under the control of the CINC the 150+ NGOs, PVOs and IOs are not controlled by any single agency. Diplomatic relationships, fostered by mutual respect and concern, provide the best conduit to influence the strategies of the NGOs, PVOs and IOs. However, it is apparent that neither the CINC nor the Ambassador can control ALL the engagement efforts in a region.

So, while Selective Engagement remains the most preferred of the post-cold war Grand Strategies, the problem of implementing a cohesive strategy used by both government and private agencies remains. As long as private agencies are permitted to operate autonomously, the President's ability to execute engagement activities, through his Ambassadors and CINCs, is confined solely to US governmental agencies and organizations.

(Word Count = 5221)

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- <sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of State, <u>Department of State Strategic Plan</u> for <u>International Affairs</u> (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Draft: 6 May 1997), 3.
- <sup>17</sup> U.S. Army War College, <u>Regional Appraisals: The Americas</u>
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  - <sup>18</sup> Ibid., C-1.
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